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Clarifying Ethical Intuitionism
Robert Cowan
In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism, whose core 
claim is that  normal ethical agents can and do have non-inferentially justified first-order 
ethical beliefs. Although this is the standard formulation, there are two senses in which it is 
importantly incomplete. Firstly, ethical intuitionism claims that there are non-inferentially 
justified ethical beliefs, but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to 
what non-inferentially  justified belief is. Secondly, it has been overlooked that there are 
plausibly different types of non-inferential justification, and that accounting for the existence 
of a specific sort of non-inferential justification is crucial for any adequate ethical intuitionist 
epistemology. In this context, it  is the purpose of this paper to provide an account of non-
inferentially  justified belief which is superior to extant accounts, and, to give a refined 
statement of the core claim of ethical intuitionism which focuses on the type of non-
inferential justification vital for a plausible intuitionist epistemology. Finally, it will be shown 
that the clarifications made in this paper make it far from obvious that two intuitionist 
accounts, which have received much recent attention, make good on intuitionism’s core 
claim.
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In recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in Ethical Intuitionism (e.g., Audi 
(2004), Bedke (2009), Huemer (2005), Shafer-Landau (2003), Stratton-lake (2002)). Despite 
the moniker, intuitionism does not require the view that intuition (whatever that may be) is 
the source of all justified ethical belief and knowledge1. Here is the core claim:
Ethical  Intuitionism (EI): normal ethical agents can and do have non-
inferentially justified first-order ethical beliefs2.
Although this is the standard formulation (an analogous formulation can be given for 
knowledge), there are two senses in which EI is importantly incomplete as a statement of 
ethical intuitionism. Firstly, EI claims that there are non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, 
but there is a worrying lack of consensus in the ethical literature as to what non-inferentially 
justified belief amounts to, e.g., differing accounts from Sinnott-Armstrong (2006), Audi 
(2008). Secondly, it has been overlooked that there are plausibly different  types of non-
inferential justification, and that accounting for the existence of a specific sort of non-
inferential justification is crucial for any adequate ethical intuitionist epistemology. 
In this context, it is the purpose of this paper to provide an account of non-inferentially 
justified belief which is superior to extant accounts, and, to give a refined statement  of the 
core claim of ethical intuitionism which focuses on the sort of non-inferential justification 
vital for a plausible intuitionist epistemology. In the final section, some possible implications 
of these refinements are discussed. Specifically, it  will be shown that the clarifications made 
in this paper make it far from obvious that two intuitionist  accounts, which have received 
much recent attention, make good on intuitionism’s core claim.
2
1. Non-inferentially Justified Belief
Ethical intuitionists claim that some ethical beliefs are non-inferentially justified. When 
considering the distinction between non-inferentially justified belief and inferentially  justified 
belief it is initially  plausible that there is some relation between these and the psychological 
notion of inference. On one view, to engage in an inference is to proceed through ‘a kind of 
passage of thought from one or more propositions to another, in part on the basis of a sense of 
some support relation between the former and the latter’ (Audi, 2008: 485)3. With this in 
mind, at least three possible distinctive features of non-inferentially justified belief emerge: 
(1) non-inferentially  justified beliefs cannot be inferred4, (2) non-inferentially  justified beliefs 
are not or need not actually be5  inferred, and (3) non-inferentially justified beliefs are 
justified independently of an ability to infer them. 
In what  follows I will reject (1) and both versions of (2) as plausible accounts of non-
inferential justification, before defending (3) against a recent objection from Tropman (2011). 
Despite being able to survive this objection, I will reject (3) on other grounds, and defend an 
improved account of non-inferentially justified belief. Given this improved account, it  will 
become clear that, contrary  to initial appearances, there is not an interesting connection 
between the non-inferential/inferential justification distinction and the psychological notion 
of inference6.
Firstly, let us briefly consider (1):
Non-Inferential (1): S has a non-inferentially justified belief that p iff S has a 
justified belief that p and cannot infer p from other propositions.
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Although it  is difficult to think of counterexamples to the sufficiency claim of this account, 
the necessary claim of (1) should be rejected. To see why, consider the following example: 
suppose that upon listening to the finale of a piano recital, Melanie comes to have a non-
inferentially  justified perceptual belief (let’s say, as the result of auditory experience) that that 
is a C# minor chord, and that subsequently, the pianist informs her that they did indeed end 
by playing a C# minor chord. It now seems that, were Melanie to listen to the performance 
again, she would have the ability to infer that the pianist was playing a C# minor chord 
(based on testimony). Nevertheless, it  would be odd if Melanie were now disbarred from 
having a non-inferentially justified belief in the proposition in question. Epistemic 
overdetermination is compatible with non-inferential justification. Hence, the necessary claim 
is false. 
One might be tempted to draw the following lesson from the failure of (1): what made 
Melanie’s belief non-inferentially  justified in the first place was that it wasn’t actually 
inferred when formed. This brings us to the weaker account (2):
Non-Inferential (2): S has a non-inferentially justified belief that p iff S’s belief 
that p is justified and S hasn’t inferred p from other propositions.
On a simple understanding of inference, where this involves some sort of consciously  explicit 
reasoning process, the sufficiency claim of (2) appears false (note that the following objection 
applies to the sufficiency claim of the weaker version of (2): S has a non-inferentially 
justified belief that p iff S’s belief that p is justified and S need not actually infer p from other 
propositions)7. This is because it is highly plausible that there are at least some justified 
beliefs that may have been arrived at in a consciously  non-inferential manner, but where we 
would be reluctant to say that such beliefs are epistemically non-inferential, e.g.,
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Proton: Upon observing a vapour trail in a cloud chamber, Martha the physicist 
non-inferentially forms the belief that that is a proton. 
Martha’s belief is formed in a psychologically non-inferential way. However, on the 
assumption that Martha’s visual experience does not have any proton content, to be justified 
in believing that  that is a proton it  seems that Martha requires the presence of justified 
ancillary beliefs linking vapour trails in cloud chambers to the presence of protons. That is, in 
the absence of these sorts of justified beliefs, her proton belief would fail to be justified. Why 
think that  this makes Martha’s belief inferentially  justified? The answer is that non-
inferentially  justified beliefs are supposed be those which are capable of halting the epistemic 
regress of justification. However, if Martha requires other justified beliefs to be justified in 
believing that that is a proton, then it seems that the regress has not been halted, as there 
remains the question of where these ancillary beliefs derive their justification from.
One might accept this but query why we ought to think that Martha’s belief really  does 
depend for its justification on other justified beliefs. The answer is that it  is highly plausible 
that beliefs about protons are not the sorts of things which are candidates for being the 
foundations of our justified belief/halting the epistemic regress of justification, at least not for 
beings like us, with our cognitive capacities and limitations. The same might be said for other 
propositions which are – intuitively, at least – not plausible candidates for non-inferential 
justification: e.g., there are 5,280 feet in a mile, bats are more closely related to primates 
than to rodents, the fall of the Roman Empire was caused partly by the military’s having too 
much influence on the government89.
At this point, someone might try  to defend (2) by  widening the notion of inferred10. The 
relevant move would be to make the following conjunctive claim: in the case of Proton, 
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Martha’s proton belief is based upon the conjunction of her perceptual experience and some 
general background belief(s) linking vapour trails with the presence of protons (where to base 
a belief on some other belief or non-doxastic state is – roughly – for the latter belief or state 
to be both the cause and reason for the formation of the former11), and, if a belief is based 
upon another belief (even partly) then this counts as an inference, albeit an implicit or tacit 
one. Given this amendment (2) would – correctly – identify Martha’s proton belief as 
inferentially justified because it involves an implicit inference. In her (2011), Tropman seems 
to suggest something like this line of thought: 
we can base a belief on another without  consciously rehearsing an inference between 
the two. Yet, when one belief is held on the basis of a reason [a belief], this belief is 
inferential in a sense that does not require the believer to work thorough an explicit 
reasoning process. If a person believes that p on the basis of her belief that  r, this 
means that  the person takes r as evidence of p. Not only does the person have the 
necessary beliefs to construct an explicit  inference to the conclusion that  p, but it 
seems that she has already made, tacitly, such an inferential connection among her 
beliefs. ((my italics) (Tropman, 2011: 362)
Although this account apparently constitutes an improvement on the original version of (2), 
the new sufficiency claim is also false (as before, the following objection also applies to the 
sufficiency claim of the weaker account: S has a non-inferentially  justified belief that p iff S’s 
belief that p is justified and S need not actually infer p from other propositions). To see why, 
note that accounting for inferential justification in terms of explicit or implicit  inference 
(where the latter is at least partly cashed out in terms of a basing relation between beliefs) is 
hostage to it being the case that in possible cases human agents do in fact base their beliefs on 
other beliefs in the relevant cases. Now consider the following amendment of Proton: 
suppose that Martha hasn’t actually  formed any beliefs linking cloud chambers, vapour trails, 
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and protons. Imagine instead that it merely seemed (intellectually)12 to Martha that there was 
some link between these, and that this non-doxastic state was a partial basis (in conjunction 
with her perceptual experience) for her belief that that is a proton. In this case Martha’s belief 
is not based upon another belief, and hence doesn’t involve a tacit inference, yet her 
justification still seems to be inferential, e.g., she requires justification for believing 
propositions other than that is a proton. Certainly, she will likely  be disposed to form beliefs 
about cloud chambers and protons and to draw the relevant inference(s) to her proton belief13, 
but in this case she has not inferred her belief in any reasonable sense of the notion. Hence, 
the amended (2) is false. Note, however, that the necessary claim of (2) may still be true. 
From the failure of (2) we have learnt that a subject need not have actually inferred a belief or 
based it upon some other belief in order for it to be inferentially justified. We may, however, 
still want to maintain that there is some relation between, on the one hand, the psychological 
notion of inference (either explicit or implicit), and on the other, the epistemological 
distinction between non-inferential and inferential justification. In light of this, we might try 
to amend the account such that for a belief that p to be justified non-inferentially  it is justified 
independently of the ability to infer p (either explicitly or implicitly 14) from other 
propositions. Hence, the following influential account of non-inferential justification 
associated with the work of Sinnott-Armstrong (2006), (2007):
Non-Inferential (3): S has a non-inferentially justified belief that p iff S has a 
justified belief that p and S’s belief is justified independently of an ability  to 
infer p from other supporting propositions they have justification for believing.
Plausibly, (3) is able to handle the amended Proton example where Martha hasn’t based her 
belief on other beliefs; (3) accounts for the justification that Martha has for her proton belief 
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at least in part by her ability  to infer it from other propositions she has justification for 
believing, e.g., about the relation between protons, vapour trails, and cloud chambers. Were 
Martha to lack this ability, the proponent of (3) will claim that she doesn’t have justification 
for believing p. Hence, (3) correctly predicts that Martha’s justification is inferential.  
Despite apparently  constituting an improvement on (2), this account has recently been 
criticised by  Tropman (2011) who appears to doubt that  any belief could be justified 
(inferentially  or non-inferentially) independently of an ability to infer it. In what follows, I 
will argue that Tropman’s argument against (3) fails, but will ultimately go on to suggest that 
the account faces problems, and that we ought to adopt an alternative to (3). 
 Tropman’s basic line of thought against (3) is that an ability of a subject to infer a 
proposition (where this includes just about any type of inference: deductive, inductive, 
statistical, enthymematic etc) from other propositions could plausibly  be required to have 
justification for believing any proposition. However, this is not  because all of our beliefs are 
justified by this sort of ability, but because the possession of this sort of ability is an enabling 
condition of justification. As she says ‘being able to draw an inference to a belief might be a 
minimal condition for being justified in believing it, even if this inferential ability  is not what 
justifies the belief’ (Tropman, 2011: 360). Tropman illustrates her point by  considering the 
claim made by some ethical intuitionists, e.g., Audi (2004), (2008), that adequately 
understanding self-evident propositions non-inferentially justifies belief in them:
 
Suppose an agent  believes a moral truth that is self-evident... Suppose further that  she 
is completely unable to form any inference whatsoever to the truth in question. In such 
a case, one might  reasonably conclude that she did not adequately understand the 
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relevant moral claim in the first  place. Take the following moral truth, a truth that Audi 
[ethical intuitionist] thinks is self-evident: It  is prima facie right to keep one’s 
promises. Consider now the number of inferences that  one could draw to the moral 
claim in question: ‘Keeping one’s promises involves being truthful, and we morally 
ought to be truthful, so we have a prima facie duty to keep one’s word’; ‘Sally is a 
very moral person, and she keeps her promises, so promise-keeping is the moral thing 
to do’; ‘we morally ought  to keep promises because breaking them lacks virtue (or is 
disrespectful or is against the law of contradicts God’s will)’... the ability to draw at 
least some of the above kinds of rationalising arguments for the morality of promise-
keeping is plausibly part  and parcel with grasping adequately the moral proposition in 
question. (Tropman, 2011: 360-1)
This idea of an enabling condition might be understood by  analogy  with the claims that moral 
particularists, e.g., Dancy  (2003), make about reasons, e.g., that a promise was not made 
under duress might be an enabling condition for an act’s being the keeping of a promise to 
constitute a moral reason for action, but not itself a reason for action. In summary: Tropman 
is claiming that (3) should be rejected because there are no beliefs (ethical or non-ethical) that 
are justified independently of an ability to infer them. This is true, even though some beliefs 
are not justified by this ability. 
In order to assess the plausibility of Tropman’s argument we should consider the question of 
why having this sort of ability would be an enabling condition for having a justified belief. It 
might seem reasonable to interpret Tropman as having something like the following thought 
in mind: having an ability to infer from other propositions is required because this sort of 
ability  is ‘part and parcel’ of understanding propositions that we believe. If one doesn’t 
possess this ability, then one doesn’t understand the proposition, and one surely  can’t be 
justified in believing a proposition one doesn’t understand.
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In order to see why this ultimately fails as an objection to (3), consider firstly the following 
point: under the present interpretation Tropman thinks that the ability to draw inferences is 
required for understanding, but it is not at all obvious that the sorts of inferences that 
Tropman has in mind – from other propositions that the agent has justification for believing – 
are part and parcel of understanding the proposition in question. To bring out this point more 
clearly, consider the distinction that Audi (1999) draws between inferences from (so-called 
internal inferences) and inferences to (so-called external inferences) a proposition, where 
only the former are associated with an understanding of the proposition in question. Here is 
an illustration of internal inference:
[consider] the proposition that the existence of great  grandchildren entails that of four 
generations of people. One might see the truth of this by noting that by definition great 
grandchildren are three generational removes from their great  grandparents and that 
this requires the existence of one additional generation, hence four. Here the partly 
definitional proposition noted is a potential ground for believing the self-evident 
proposition, but  the inference can still be considered internal because this ground is 
accessible by simple conceptual understanding of the original proposition. (Audi, 
1999: 218)
The point of interest here is that  the examples Tropman gives of inferences required for 
understanding are all inferences to the proposition (indeed she explicitly uses this sort of 
language: ‘Consider now the number of inferences that one could draw to the moral claim in 
question’), and it is not at all obvious that  these are plausibly  required in order to be said to 
possess understanding. To make it more plausible, Tropman’s claim should be amended such 
that an ability to make internal inferences is a sort of enabling condition for justification. 
However, it is now hard to see how this does conflict with (3), since the claim made there is 
that non-inferentially justified belief is that which is independent of an ability of S to infer 
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that p from other propositions, and it is not obvious that the propositions involved in internal 
inferences get to count as other propositions (in the relevant sense) if they are ‘partly 
definitional’. Hence, if this was the intended point, it fails to cause problems for the account 
of non-inferentially justified belief under consideration15.
Given that the requirement of an ability  to draw internal inferences does not seem to be 
incompatible with (3), in order to constitute an objection Tropman would need to show that 
external inferences of the sort that she describes, e.g., ‘Sally is a very moral person, and she 
keeps her promises, so promise-keeping is the moral thing to do’, are required in order to 
possess understanding of a proposition, e.g., acts of promise keeping are prima facie right. 
Aside from being unintuitive, there remains the serious task of providing an account of which 
external inferences are required for understanding a particular proposition, p. The alternative 
would be to say that external inferences are required but to impose no limits on what these 
might be. However, on this second account it becomes puzzling as to why such an ability is 
necessary  for understanding a particular proposition (and hence enabling justification for 
belief), p, since the inferences that enable one to be justified in believing that p could feasibly 
be the same as those required to understand some completely  (semantically) unrelated 
proposition, r. This is an odd result16. Hence, the burden of proof is on Tropman to provide an 
account of specifying the external inferences required for understanding. 
Briefly, here is an attempt to discharge this burden that ultimately doesn’t work. If we limit 
discussion to the ethical domain there may indeed be a sense of understanding which requires 
the ability  to draw external inferences. Consider a view similar to that held by Hopkins 
(2007) and Hills (2009) that the goal of ethical thinking is to attain an ethical understanding, 
where an understanding is not basic semantic comprehension but instead involves a grasp of 
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the ethical reasons that make one’s ethical judgments true, e.g., that an action was wrong 
because it  involved causing needless suffering17 . On this sort of view, it  might be plausible to 
posit the existence of a norm of belief governing ethical discourse; namely, that one needs to 
have a grasp of the reasons that make an ethical judgment true in order to be entitled to hold 
that belief, even if one has justification for the belief independently of this grasp. 
In this context, Tropman may want to claim that an ability  to draw external inferences to 
one’s ethical judgment about the reasons why one’s ethical belief is true is an enabling 
condition for justification. This is because such an inferential ability might be required for 
ethical understanding. However, there is an important dissimilarity  between this and the 
account just sketched. Whereas on the latter view a norm plausibly  governs entitlement to 
form justified beliefs but not justification, Tropman’s account would appear to imply that 
such a norm governs the existence of justification itself.  But that  sounds like all justification 
is inferential. Given this, Tropman would need to explain how such external inferences are 
merely enabling conditions and don’t introduce some sort  of inferential epistemic 
dependency18.
In lieu of an improved account, Tropman’s challenge to (3) fails. Notably, ethical intuitionists 
such as Audi appear to agree that an ability to infer is not an enabling condition of 
justification, e.g., ‘[an] ability to infer a proposition is not a general requirement for 
justifiedly believing it’ (Audi, 2007: 204). 
Despite surviving this challenge it  will now be argued that we have reason to reject  (3). This 
is because the concomitant account  of inferential justification is inadequate. After having 
explained this point, I will briefly present an improved account of non-inferential 
justification. Interestingly, on this account, there does not seem to be an interesting 
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connection between the non-inferential/inferential justification distinction and the 
psychological notion of inference (explicit or implicit).
To see why, consider the concomitant account of inferential justification we get if we accept 
(3): inferentially  justified beliefs are epistemologically  dependent on an ability to infer them 
from other supporting propositions. Notice that, at least on the explicit sense of inference, this 
seems to suggest a focus on demonstrative justification, i.e., the ability to show that one is 
justified, rather than the state of being (inferentially) justified (cf. Shafer-Landau (2003)). 
However, in giving an account of inferential justification it seems to make more sense to say 
that someone who does in fact have justification for believing propositions that support p will 
be inferentially  justified in virtue of their commitment to these supporting propositions (even 
if this falls short of belief), rather than an ability to draw inferences (explicit or implicit) that 
reflect these commitments. In most cases it  is of course plausible that subjects will be able to 
draw inferences (and we might admit that this is a clear sign that they are justified, the 
absence of which might make us doubt that the subject is in fact justified), but we might still 
doubt that it  this ability that is doing the justificatory work in the case of inferential 
justification, as opposed to actually having justification for believing other propositions (and 
perhaps basing their belief on these propositional justifications). This suggests that we should 
reject (3) and adopt the following improved account of non-inferential justification:
Non-Inferential (4): S has a non-inferentially justified belief that p iff S has a 
justified belief that p and S’s belief is justified independently of their 
justification for believing other supporting propositions19.
Assuming that (4) does constitute the most satisfactory account of non-inferential 
justification, the following points are worth noting: firstly, the notion of a supporting 
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proposition is supposed to pick out a positive epistemic dependence, i.e., justification for 
believing supporting propositions is what justifies the belief in question20. Secondly, it 
remains agnostic as to whether justified beliefs are required to be based upon adequate 
propositional justifications for belief. Finally, the account suggests a detachment of 
inferential and non-inferential justification from the psychological notion of inference, i.e., 
inferential justification does not depend on actual inference, nor on the ability to make 
inferences (in either the explicit or implicit  senses). Following from this, one might think that 
to call this inferential justification is a misnomer. If one is sympathetic to this thought then 
perhaps mediate justification21 is a more appropriate label, with immediate justification being 
the sort of justification that we associate with ethical intuitionism and halting the epistemic 
regress. 
2. Refining Ethical Intuitionism
The standard statement of ethical intuitionism is that ordinary agents have at least  some non-
inferentially  justified first-order ethical beliefs. In the previous section it  was argued that this 
is best understood as the claim that there are some ethical beliefs that don’t depend for their 
justification on subject’s having justification for believing other propositions (ethical or 
otherwise). However, as will now be shown, this is an incomplete statement of ethical 
intuitionism. 
In order to begin to see this, consider that in general epistemology  there is a reasonable 
degree of consensus that if anything is, the following are sources of non-inferential 
justification: perceptual experience, a priori intuition, introspection, and memory22. Despite 
this, no-one defends an ethical intuitionism that is based upon introspection or memory. This 
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suggests that there may be more to the core claim of ethical intuitionism than is normally 
thought. Providing an explanation of why no-one defends these views will hopefully  reveal 
what more there is to it.
Explaining the lack of an Introspective Intuitionism in contemporary ethical epistemology is 
relatively easy: introspection doesn’t plausibly provide non-inferential justification for first-
order beliefs (ethical or otherwise) as EI requires23. Instead, the focus will be on an 
intuitionist view which assumes that memory is the source of non-inferentially  justified 
beliefs, e.g., Audi (1998):
Memory Intuitionism (MI): normal ethical agents have non-inferentially 
justified ethical beliefs by remembering them. 
It seems obvious that, by itself, Memory Intuitionism does not constitute a serious intuitionist 
epistemology, i.e., it is not a plausible independent account24. Explaining what, exactly, is 
wrong with MI is somewhat trickier. Two possible explanations of what is problematic about 
MI will be offered which will ultimately illuminate how best to construe ethical intuitionism. 
Getting there will require a consideration of two leading accounts of the epistemology of 
memory. 
Firstly, many  philosophers hold a Preservationist view about memory (e.g., Owens (2000), 
Senor (2007)), which roughly amounts to the view that the process of remembering p or 
seeming to remember p cannot generate justification for believing that p. Rather, memory 
can at best preserve a previous (non-memorial) justification that one had for p, even if the 
justification that one has in virtue of one’s memory is non-inferential. Put another way, 
memory beliefs or memory seemings that p are (positively) epistemically dependent on one 
having had some other justification for p, even if they are not dependent on there being 
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justification for believing propositions other than p. Note that this essentially involves 
adopting an externalist account of memory  justification, i.e., one which limits the role of 
consciously  accessible internal factors vis-a-vis the justified status of a belief. This is because 
on the Preservationist view a subject may not be aware that the belief they  have remembered 
is in fact unjustified (e.g., they may  have forgotten that they formed it on the basis of wishful-
thinking or on a whim), even though they might appear justified from their own subjective 
perspective.
Assume for now that Preservationism is the correct epistemology of memory. It seems that 
we have the following explanation of what is unsatisfactory  about Memory Intuitionism: MI 
only gives us an account of how defeasible non-inferential justification for ethical belief can 
be preserved but not how it is generated. If MI were formulated such that our generative 
ethical justification is inferential, then one might reasonably think that this is a cheap or 
trivial sort of ethical intuitionism. Alternatively, if MI were amended so as to state that we 
have generative non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs, which we can be non-inferentially 
justified in believing when remembered, this would leave the account significantly 
incomplete: we would now want to know where the generative non-inferential justification 
for ethical beliefs is coming from.
Independently  of the plausibility  of Preservationism, there is a general lesson to be learnt 
from this account which will inform a refinement of what ethical intuitionism is. It seems that 
any satisfactory ethical intuitionism ought to account for the existence of non-inferentially 
justified ethical beliefs that are justified by generative sources, i.e., that are epistemically 
independent of having justification for believing the relevant propositions from other sources. 
Notice that this shifts the focus of our attention towards sources of justified belief, rather than 
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justified beliefs themselves. Hence, the core claim of ethical intuitionism should be 
reformulated so as to read:
Ethical  Intuitionism (EI): normal ethical agents can and do have epistemically 
independent non-inferential justification for first-order ethical beliefs.
Epistemic independence is being understood in contradistinction to epistemic dependency, 
which can be summarised thus:
Epistemic Dependency (ED): a state, d, epistemically depends on another state, 
e, with respect to content c iff e must be justified or justification-conferring in 
order for d to be justified or justification-conferring with respect to content c25.
With this refinement of ethical intuitionism in hand it is worth considering an alternative 
explanation of what is problematic about Memory Intuitionism. The previous explanation 
depended upon a particular Preservationist view of the epistemology of memory. However, 
some philosophers (Audi (1998), Schroer (2007)) endorse Memory Foundationalism, which 
claims that memory  is in fact a generative source of justification i.e., memory is able to 
render beliefs justified without their having being justified by some other, intuitively more 
basic, source, e.g., perception. Note that proponents of this view tend to endorse a reasonably 
strong sort  of internalism about justification, whereby justification is determined by 
‘internal’ factors of individuals, e.g., mental states like beliefs or appearances. On this 
conception, individuals who are ‘internally’ identical to us, but are unfortunate enough to 
inhabit a Cartesian Demon world (where we there is little or no knowledge of the external 
world), could still have justified beliefs. 
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Even if this were the correct account of the epistemology of memory, it seems that Memory 
Intuitionism should still not be taken seriously. To see why this is true, consider the non-
ethical analogue of Memory Intuitionism, i.e., we have non-inferentially  justified non-ethical 
beliefs in virtue of memory. In this case it seems that merely positing the justification-
conferring powers of memory would be insufficient as an account or explanation of how we 
have knowledge of the external world. Memory  is the wrong sort of state to posit as hooking 
us up  to a mind-independent external reality in a way that  is plausibly required for 
knowledge. A similar point can be made about the ethical case; merely positing memory as 
the source of non-inferentially justified belief seems inadequate because it is not a plausible 
candidate for the sort of thing that would, by itself, connect us to a mind-independent ethical 
reality 26. More specifically, memory does not constitute what  Prichard (1912) referred to as 
an ‘act of moral thinking’ or what Väyrynen (2008) refers to as ‘substantive ethical thought’ 
where these terms are to be taken as picking out processes or states that perform a similar 
functional role as perceptual experiences do vis-a-vis our justified empirical beliefs, which 
we pre-theoretically regard as sources of knowledge.
Notice that we need not think that Memory  Foundationalism is a plausible epistemology of 
memory in order to learn something about what is required of a plausible ethical intuitionism. 
For it seems that  any plausible ethical intuitionist  account ought to explain the existence of 
epistemically independent non-inferential justification in terms of a process or state which 
can plausibly be construed as hooking us up  to a mind-independent ethical reality, i.e., as 
involving substantive ethical thought. Hence, the core claim of ethical intuitionism ought to 
be reformulated:
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Ethical  Intuitionism (EI): normal ethical agents can and do have epistemically 
independent non-inferential justification for first-order ethical beliefs that is 
the result of substantive ethical thinking.
3. Implications?
Having provided an account of non-inferential justification, and a refined statement of the 
core claim of ethical intuitionism, this final section will briefly  consider the implications for 
two extant accounts which have received a good deal of recent attention: Affectual 
Intuitionism and Perceptual Intuitionism. For purposes of space, the discussion will be short 
and of a broad-brush nature, but is suggestive of future development.
Consider the following account which is endorsed by some contemporary intuitionists, e.g., 
Roeser (2011):
Affectual Intuitionism (AI): normal ethical agents have non-inferential 
justification for first-order ethical beliefs in virtue of emotional experiences. 
For AI to constitute a plausible independent account of ethical intuitionism, the non-
inferential justification provided by emotional experience needs to be of an epistemically 
independent sort (let’s just assume that emotions do involve something like an ‘act of moral 
thinking’). 
Here is one reason to think that emotional experiences are (positively) epistemically 
dependent: on one plausible view of the emotions, e.g., see Brady (2011), Goldie (2004), 
emotional experiences are best understood as non-doxastic representational states which can, 
however, be justified or unjustified. Emotions can be justified or unjustified because they are, 
or ought to be, responsive to reasons, e.g., my acting lecherously at the party is a reason for 
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me to feel guilty. With regard to the epistemology of emotions, it  seems that one could 
reasonably take the view27  that, if they are to play  any  role in non-inferentially justifying 
evaluative or ethical beliefs, it is necessary that they are justified. Further, one might think 
that emotions are themselves justified only if they are had in response to justified or 
justification-conferring states about the presence of features of the world which make the 
emotional response justified, i.e., features that are reasons for the emotion. To illustrate; my 
guilt – with representational content that I have acted wrongly – is justified only  if it  is had in 
response to justified or justification-conferring states about the presence of features of the 
world which make it appropriate for me to feel guilty, such as my lecherous behaviour at  the 
party 28. However, if this is the correct account of emotions and their epistemology  (and note 
that it  is not being endorsed here), then it seems that emotional experience is epistemically 
dependent in the way defined29. If so, then Affectual Intuitionism is not, by itself, an adequate 
intuitionist account.
Someone might object that the epistemic dependency in question is of a relatively innocuous 
sort. The thought would be that there is an important sense in which the putative justification 
one gets from one’s emotional experience in these sorts of cases is generative, i.e., emotional 
experience generates justification for ethical belief where there was none, despite being 
epistemically dependent on having justification for believing other evaluative propositions. 
Note, however, that for this move to be legitimate, it seems to require that we can draw a 
sharp distinction between the evaluative and the ethical which may not be very plausible. In 
any case, even if there is a division between the two, it is not obvious that this sort of 
epistemic dependency really is innocuous from the point of view of ethical intuitionism.
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Affectual Intuitionism is potentially problematic due to an apparent epistemic dependence on 
justification for believing evaluative propositions. Consider now an account of intuitionism, 
which, at least on one particular interpretation, may  involve an epistemic dependency on 
justification for believing ethical propositions. This would mean that it  is, by itself, an 
inadequate account  of ethical intuitionism since it  doesn’t make good on the core claim. The 
account in mind is the following30:
Perceptual Intuitionism (PI): normal ethical agents have non-inferential 
justification for first-order ethical beliefs by having ethical perceptual 
experiences. 
If true, PI would seem to constitute an a posteriori version of ethical intuitionism, providing 
an independent  alternative to more popular a priori accounts, e.g., seemings and self-evidence 
accounts (see Huemer (2005) and Audi (2004)). Perceptual Intuitionism may therefore hold 
considerable attraction for ethical naturalists. 
In recent discussions of PI (e.g., Väyrynen, (2008)), it has been assumed that in order for the 
view to get off the ground, the following non-epistemological view would have to be true:
Ethical  Perception  (EP): normal ethical agents can and do have perceptual 
experiences (at least some of which are veridical) as of the instantiation of 
ethical properties31.
Arguably, the most plausible way of making good on the central claim of EP is that ethical 
perception is an acquired capacity whose acquisition is facilitated by  a process of cognitive 
penetration32. An initial way  of thinking about cognitive penetration is simply  to understand 
it as grounding the idea that what a subject non-perceptually thinks can alter the way  in 
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which they perceptually experience the world, or that perception is ‘theory-laden’. More 
specifically, a visual experience, e, is cognitively penetrated if the representational content 
and phenomenal character of e are altered by states in the cognitive system, e.g., beliefs, 
concepts, desires, emotions, memories, imaginative states, intuitions, and where this does not 
merely involve those cognitive states having effects on the subject’s visual attention. Further, 
if cognitive penetration is possible then the following scenario will be possible: two subjects 
could be attending to identical distal visual stimuli, s, whilst having different perceptual 
experiences, e and e* due to differences in their cognitive economy. For example, suppose 
that I believe that John is angry but you don’t. If cognitive penetration is possible, then upon 
seeing John, I may perceptually represent John’s anger (because of my belief), while you do 
not because you lack the relevant belief. This is despite the fact that  we are both attending to 
the same stimuli, e.g., John’s facial features.
We can be more specific about the type of cognitive penetration plausibly involved in ethical 
perception. Firstly, we can consider the nature of the alteration to the content of perceptual 
experience brought about by states in the cognitive system. There are broadly two ways in 
which this might work: either cognitive penetration will involve the alteration or 
modification of already existing perceptual contents, or, it may involve the addition of 
perceptual contents to already existing contents. For an example of the first type of alteration: 
consider a study conducted by Delk and Fillenbaum (1965), and highlighted by Macpherson 
(2012), where it appears that  the background beliefs of subjects about shapes that are 
characteristically red altered their perceptual experience when presented with these shapes; 
namely, they  represented them as being more red than they actually  were. For an example of 
the second type of alteration, it is plausible to think that someone who can identify pine trees 
by sight may perceive the same sorts of features that  non-experts perceive, e.g., the leaves 
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and branches etc., but because of their expertise their perceptual experience represents, in 
addition to these features, the property of being a pine tree33. 
Although it will not be argued for here, it seems most plausible that ethical cognitive 
penetration, which involves a sort of perceptual expertise, will involve the addition of ethical 
perceptual contents to already  existing non-ethical perceptual contents, without the 
modification of the latter. For example, two people – David and Martha – who are presented 
with the scene of hoodlums setting fire to a cat, may both perceive the very  same non-ethical 
features, e.g., the screams of the cat, the laughter of the hoodlums etc, but because of 
Martha’s ethical background beliefs, her perceptual experience represents, in addition to 
these features, the property of wrongness (prima facie or all things considered), while David’s 
does not.   
Cognitive penetration involves an etiological dependency of perceptual content on states in 
the cognitive system. To be more specific, two types of etiological dependency can be 
distinguished: firstly, there are apparently  cases (see Delk and Fillenbaum (1965)) where 
subjects have had experiences of, e.g., a particular shade of red, due to cognitive penetration, 
but where those subjects do not generally require penetrating states with that sort of content 
in order to be in that type of perceptual state, e.g., they could have an experience of that 
shade of red without cognitive penetration. A stronger sort of dependency is exemplified in 
cases where the subject does generally require penetrating states with that type of content in 
order to be in a perceptual state with that  content (see Macpherson (unpublished) for 
discussion). It seems that ethical cases of cognitive penetration will fall into the latter 
category, given the assumption that ethical perception is an acquired capacity. Indeed, more 
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generally, we might think that cases of expert perception involve this strong etiological 
dependence because here cognitive penetration allows experts to see things that other people 
(non-experts) cannot34.
With this in mind, in the sorts of ethical cases that  are of interest, the thought is that a 
subject’s ethical beliefs, or some other cognitive states with ethical content, e.g., emotions, 
intuitions or concepts, could alter the way  they perceptually experience the world such that 
they  can literally see the world in a distinctively  ethical way. For example, when presented 
with a scene of the torture of a cat, a subject’s emotional experience of indignation or moral 
outrage (let’s say, with something like the content that is wrong) might cognitively  penetrate 
their perceptual experience such that, in addition to experiencing the scene of animal torture, 
their visual experience represents the wrongness of the animal torture. 
The general point is that, on this view, having visual experiences with the sort of content 
apparently  required to ground Perceptual Intuitionism is etiologically dependent upon the 
presence of the subject possessing other cognitive states with ethical contents. Supposing that 
EP is true, and is only true thanks to cognitive penetration, we can ask whether the 
justification conferred by ethical perceptual experiences confers epistemically independent 
non-inferential justification and involves substantive ethical thinking. Given space constraints 
it will not be possible to settle these questions here. Instead, the more modest goal will be to 
show that it is far from obvious that Perceptual Intuitionism really  is, by itself, an adequate 
intuitionist account.
Focus first on the claim that ethical perceptual experiences confer epistemically  independent 
non-inferential justification. Someone who denies this would essentially be holding some sort 
form of Preservationism about ethical perceptual experiences (brought about by cognitive 
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penetration), i.e., the claim that ethical perceptual experiences are epistemically dependent on 
the justification-conferring powers of background cognitive states. To see why this might be 
plausible, consider the following example:
Proton*: Upon observing a vapour trail in a cloud chamber, Martha the 
physicist has a perceptual experience – the result of cognitive penetration by 
the belief that that is a proton – with the content that that is a proton. However, 
the background belief that penetrated her experience is unjustified, having 
being formed as a result of wishful-thinking.
Many will think it plausible that Martha doesn’t get justification from her perception in this 
case, due to the unjustified status of her background belief35. Further, we might think that this 
holds even if Martha is not aware that her penetrating background state is unjustified. If that 
is right, then one might be tempted to adopt a Preservationist view about cognitively 
penetrated ethical experiences, i.e., they only justify  if the penetrating state is justified or 
justification-conferring. If this is correct, then Perceptual Intuitionism is not, by  itself, a 
plausible version of ethical intuitionism. Indeed, if we assume an analogous Preservationist 
view about memory, Perceptual Intuitionism will be about as epistemologically  significant as 
Memory Intuitionism36.
Perhaps unimpressed by this example, or with Preservationism more generally, someone 
might claim that a Foundationalist view about ethical perceptual experience (including 
cognitively penetrated experiences of the sort under scrutiny) is more plausible37. This is the 
view that ethical perceptual experiences can justify  beliefs, even if the penetrating states are 
not themselves justified or justification-conferring, and so would ground epistemically 
independent non-inferentially justified beliefs (note that this will be most happily allied with 
25
an internalist view about justification). However, even if this is correct, ethical perception 
needs to involve substantive ethical thought for it to fulfill the core claim of ethical 
intuitionism, i.e., it must be the right sort of state for hooking us up  to a mind-independent 
ethical reality and grounding ethical knowledge. 
The point of interest here is that, if the ethical contents of ethical perceptual experience are 
being brought about by other cognitive states via cognitive penetration, then it is far from 
obvious that ethical perception really  does involve substantive ethical thought. Indeed, we 
might doubt that perception – construed in the way discussed – is how beings like us do 
substantive ethical thinking. To illustrate, consider a case where an ethical agent merely 
possesses the ethical concept of WRONGNESS and has engaged in no substantive ethical 
thinking. Assume also that the concept has little or no substantive content. If the concept were 
to penetrate the agent’s experience such that they  had a visual experience as of, e.g., the 
wrongness of animal torture, two possibilities present themselves: either the agent underwent 
some non-perceptual substantive ethical thinking, or else they didn’t. In the latter case it 
seems that the agent has engaged in no substantive ethical thought. Instead, in cases of ethical 
perceptual experience it is more plausible to think that substantive ethical thinking is really 
being done elsewhere, e.g., in ethical reflection, emotion, or intuition, which then calls for an 
adequate account of their epistemological credentials. Hence, by itself, Perceptual 
Intuitionism may be inadequate, even on this alternative Foundationalist view38, and hopes 
for an independent a posteriori ethical intuitionism may be in jeopardy. 
4. Conclusion
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In this paper an improved account of non-inferentially justified belief and a refined statement 
of the core claim of ethical intuitionism have been offered. It was then shown that, once 
clarified and refined, whether an epistemological account can be regarded as grounding an 
adequate intuitionist epistemology is not as clear-cut as has been assumed39.
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Notes
1 One possible exception to this is Huemer (2005).
2 This is what I take to be the core thesis of ethical intuitionism. The view has, however, been traditionally and 
contemporarily associated with metaphysical views, e.g., mind-independent ethical realism, ethical non-
naturalism and ethical pluralism. With the exception of mind-independent realism, I will be remaining agnostic 
on these ancillary views in this paper.
3 See also Sinnott-Armstrong (2011) for a similar account.
4  Note that one might wonder why anyone would hold this view. I admit that, given recent developments in 
epistemology, e.g., the work of Robert Audi which stresses that there is nothing suspect about beliefs being both 
inferentially and non-inferentially justified, it may no longer be even prima facie plausible.  Having said that, 
there are two reasons to include discussion: (a) In his discussion of the self-evidence of the prima facie moral 
duties, W.D. Ross (2002), p.  30 says things which suggest that held something like this view of non-inferential 
justification, and, (b) Some contemporary discussions of intuitionism, e.g.,  Sinnott-Armstrong (2002), p. 310, 
slip into speaking in this way about non-inferential justification. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for EJP for 
pressing me to justify the inclusion of NI (1).
5 Although these are different accounts, I class them together for the following reasons: (i) as will be shown, 
they face the same objections to their respective sufficiency claims, (ii) they are sufficiently similar that a 
separate treatment of both would needlessly complicate matters.
6 As will become clear, this applies to both explicit and implicit inferences.
7 Interestingly, some might think that the necessary claim of (2) is also false. This would be because one agrees 
with Helmholtz (1962) that perception involves unconscious enthymematic inferences from what we might think 
of as raw experiential data to conscious perceptual experience that can play a justifying and rationalising role of 
belief and action, but yet maintains that perceptual experiences confer non-inferential justification. The natural 
line of response here for the defender of (2) is that these unconscious or subpersonal inferences aren’t really 
inferences at all, but not everyone agrees on this matter. See Lyons, (2009) pp. 58-61 for discussion.
8 These examples are taken from Lyons (2009).
9 This point is subject to qualification. As will be suggested in §2, we can distinguish between different types of 
non-inferential justification; epistemically dependent and epistemically independent non-inferential justification. 
In the case of proton beliefs (and the others listed above), it is implausible to think that these are epistemically 
independent non-inferentially justified beliefs.
10 The view sketched here appears to be held by Audi (1998) and Tropman (2011).
11 For some discussion of the basing relation in epistemology see Audi (1993) and Huemer (2007).
12 Contemporary intuitionists such as Audi (2008) and Huemer (2005) claim that intellectual seeming states can 
justify.
13 See Audi (1994) for the distinction between dispositions-to-believe and dispositional beliefs.
14 The distinction between explicit and implicit inferences drawn in the discussion of (2) should be kept in mind 
throughout the discussion of (3). Tropman’s argument against (3) emphasises the explicit sense of inference. 
Note, that the points I go on to make for and against (3) are compatible with either notion. 
15 One might think that the discussion has been unfairly limited to mere basic semantic understanding, and that 
the focus should instead be on what Audi (1999), (2004), refers to as adequate understanding, with the latter 
being presumably more robust. However, it is not clear that there is any substantial difference between the two. 
See 2004, pp. 49/50.
16 Given her apparent endorsement of the existence of self-evident truths, it seems that Tropman is not a 
semantic holist.
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17  One reason to think that this is correct comes from an apparently plausible view about ethical testimony. 
Roughly,  the idea is that, although ethical testimony can plausibly transmit justification for belief to its 
recipients, there is still something normatively dubious about forming an ethical belief merely on the basis of 
someone else’s say-so. The explanation of what is dubious about ethical testimony is that, in the relevant cases, 
ethical testimony does not provide the recipient with a grasp of the ethical reasons. Note,  however, that this 
pessimist view about ethical testimony is not without its critics. See Sliwa (2012), Philosophical Studies, for an 
argument against pessimism. I am not endorsing pessimism about ethical or evaluative testimony. Rather, I am 
simply offering the view that understanding is the goal of ethical and evaluative thinking as a way (which 
ultimately fails) for Tropman to respond to my objections.  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to 
be clearer about this.
18 There is at least one further possible epicycle. Tropman might alter her claim to be about entitlement to belief 
rather than justification (making her account like Hopkins’). However, she would then be faced with providing 
an account of why an external inferential ability might be required. This seems particularly important given that 
Hopkins himself allows that someone may be said to grasp ethical reasons, e.g., by having an ethical experience 
of their presence, and hence be entitled to their ethical belief, even if they can’t articulate what they are (2007, 
p. 632). Tropman needs to occupy a stronger and seemingly implausible position.
19 Sinnott-Armstrong (2011) has suggested an updated account of non-inferential justification which seems to 
be compatible with (4).
20 For discussion of negative epistemic dependency and its compatibility with non-inferential justification see 
Audi (1993)
21 See Pryor (2004) for an account of mediate justification that is very similar to mine. See also Väyrynen 
(2008) for a discussion of ethical intuitionism which refers to this alternative terminology.
22 A good deal less consensus surrounds the addition of emotion and testimony to this list. Also, naturalists will 
reject the inclusion of  a priori intuition.
23 Of course, there is an inferential route from introspective beliefs to first-order ethical beliefs via the 
following sort of bridging principle (which would of course need to be justified): Most (all?) of the things that I 
believe are true.
24 On the assumption that testimony is a source of non-inferentially justified belief – see Audi (forthcoming) for 
this claim – a similarly problematic account would be Testimonial Intuitionism, i.e., Normal ethical agents have 
non-inferentially justified ethical beliefs by being told about them.
25 The notion of epistemic dependency comes from the work of Robert Audi. For a brief discussion of this in the 
context of ethical epistemology see his (1997), p. 117
26 See Depaul (1993) Ch.1 for a discussion of the No Contact With Ethical Reality objection to the epistemic 
powers of intuition.
27 It seems that Goldie (2004) holds something like this view. 
28 It is not clear, exactly, what we or proponents of this sort of view ought to say about the epistemology of 
emotional experiences had in response to hypothetical cases.
29 Note that the epistemic dependency might be that associated with inferential or mediate justification, at least 
on my conception of this notion (see §1).
30 For discussion see especially Väyrynen (2008) and Audi (2010).
31 As is standard, the focus is on visual perception. A representationalist theory of perception is being assumed, 
i.e., (roughly) the view that to have a perceptual experience of an object O as having a property F, is to be in a 
perceptual mental state with phenomenal character which represents O as having the property F, i.e., has 
representational content O is F.
32 For discussion, see Pylyshyn (1999), Siegel (2011), Macpherson (2012).
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33  In a more specific terminology, it may involve the alteration of that which is represented as phenomenally 
present or involve the addition of phenomenally present as absent representation See, e.g.,  Macpherson 
(forthcoming) for this terminology.
34  Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for EJP for pressing me to explain these points and distinctions in more 
detail.
35 See Siegel (2012) for a similar sort of case.
36 One possible disanalogy springs to mind. In the perceptual case, the contents of penetrating state may be 
more general than the content of the visual experience, e.g., content of penetrating belief is all torture is wrong, 
and the content of visual experience is that is wrong (or something like it). However, note that there is still 
epistemic dependency in both cases. Further, if the perceptual experiences are epistemically dependent on 
justified or justification-conferring states with a different content, then this would seem to suggest that the 
resultant justification is inferential or mediate.
37 Note that this would seem to entail that Martha has non-inferential generative justification for the belief that 
that is a proton. Given earlier remarks this may seem like an implausible result.
38 It seems that a similar point holds for the view that there are at least some cases where the penetrating states 
in ethical cognitive penetration aren’t justified, but where we still ought to think that the perceptual experience 
is capable of justifying.
31
39 Thanks to Michael Brady, Jennifer Corns, Fiona Macpherson, and an anonymous reviewer for EJP for helpful 
comments on earlier drafts of the paper.
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